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DAVID

T. KEELING*

The Free Movement of Goods in EEC
Law: Basic Principles and Recent
Developments in the Case Law of the
Court of Justice of the European
Communities**
I. The Basic Rules
The cornerstone of the European Community is the principle of the free
movement of goods. That principle requires that goods placed on the market in
any Member State may be traded freely throughout the Community. No customs
duties or charges having equivalent effect may be levied on trade between Member States; nor may such trade be subject to quantitative restrictions-meaning
quotas and prohibitions-or to measures having equivalent effect. The principle
of free movement applies not only to goods produced in a Member State, but also
to goods originating in nonmember countries once they have been duly imported
into a Member State and any customs duties payable under the Common Customs Tariff have been accounted for.1
This article focuses on the elimination of quantitative restrictions between
Member States, since that is the area in which some of the most difficult-and
also the most interesting-legal problems have arisen. The relevant provisions
are contained in articles 30 to 36 of the EEC Treaty. Article 30 prohibits
"[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect
...between Member States." Article 34 makes similar provision in relation to
exports. Article 36 qualifies that basic principle of free movement by expressly
*Law Clerk at the Court of Justice of the European Communities. The views expressed in this
article are entirely personal to the author.
**This article is derived from a speech delivered by the author at the ABA Annual Meeting in
Atlanta, Georgia, on August 12, 1991.
1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 9(2),
10(l), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 19 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
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authorizing prohibitions and restrictions justified on a number of grounds, notably public morality, public health, and the protection of industrial and commercial property.
The case law on these provisions is voluminous. Since 1963 the Court has
delivered 460 preliminary rulings 2 related to the free movement of goods. In
addition, it has given judgment in 102 actions brought by the European Commission under article 169 of the EEC Treaty for a declaration that a Member
State has failed to fulfill its Treaty obligations in connection with the free movement of goods.
One brief point should be made before embarking on a review of that case law.
Although the language of articles 30 and 34 is virtually identical, the Court has
always taken a less rigorous attitude towards restrictions on exports than towards
restrictions on -imports, presumably on the ground that Member States are far less
likely to impede exports. The Court considers that article 34 applies only to
measures that have as their specific object or effect the restriction of exports and
thus establish a difference in treatment between a Member State's domestic trade
and its
export trade. In Groenveld v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees 3 the Court
held that article 34 was not infringed by a Dutch law that prohibited sausage
manufacturers in the Netherlands from stocking or processing horsemeat. Obviously the law affected exports in a sense, since it prevented Dutch sausage
makers from manufacturing horsemeat sausages for export to other Member
States. However, the nondiscriminatory nature of the law meant that it was not
contrary to article 34.
In relation to measures restricting imports, the Court has been far more
stringent. It has opted for an extremely wide definition of the concept of
measures having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports. The
leading case is Procureurdu Roi v. Dassonville,4 in which the Court held that:
"All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering,
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be
considered
as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restric' 5
tions.
The breadth of that definition of measures having equivalent effect has been
amplified by a ruling in Van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern6 to the effect that
even a slight hindrance to imports is sufficient to bring article 30 into play. Thus,
at least in theory, even a measure that causes a slight, indirect, potential hindrance to trade between Member States offends against article 30.
2. Judgments delivered up to and including February 12, 1992, are included.
3. Case 15/79, Groenveld v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, 1979 E.C.R. 3409, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8617 (1979).
4. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 14 C.M.L.R. 436 (1974).
5. Id., 14 C.M.L.R. at 453-54.
6. Joined Cases 177 and 178/82, Public Prosecutor v. Jan van de Haar and Kaveka de Meer,
1984 E.C.R. 1797, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,094 (1984).
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II. The Cassis de Dijon Principle
The greatest obstacles to trade between Member States are due to disparities
between national legislation regarding, for example, technical standards, the
composition of foodstuffs, sizes, packaging, labeling, and so forth. Obviously
the best solution to such obstacles to trade is to strike at the root of the problem
by eliminating the disparities in national legislation. To that end, article 100 of
the EEC Treaty (now supplemented by article 100a) empowers the Council of
Ministers to adopt directives harmonizing legislation that directly affects the
establishment or functioning of the common market. Many such directives have
been issued.
But harmonization is a slow process and may not even be perceived as desirable by everyone. It follows that obstacles resulting from disparities in national
legislation will continue to hamper trade between Member States for a long time
to come. Initially, it was thought by many that, provided a Member State applied
its legislation without distinction to domestic goods and to goods produced in
other Member States, there was no breach of article 30. In other words, it was
believed that article 30 only prohibited discriminatory measures. That myth was
shattered in 1979 by the Court's judgment in Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Branntwein.7 In that case the German authorities refused to
authorize the marketing in Germany of a French liqueur known as Cassis de
Dijon on the ground that the liqueur did not comply with a German provision
under which such beverages must have a minimum alcohol content of 25 percent.
The German authorities argued that since the German provision applied without
distinction to domestic and imported products it was not caught by the prohibition laid down in article 30. The Court rejected that argument and held that
obstacles to trade caused by disparities in national laws were permitted only in so
far as the provisions in question were necessary to satisfy mandatory requirements 8 relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, fair trading, and consumer protection.
Cassis de Dijon-as the case became known-was indeed a landmark judgment. As a result of the decision, many of the obstacles to trade resulting from
disparities in national legislation were swept aside, whereas it had previously
been thought that such obstacles could only be removed by harmonization of
national laws. But in another sense the judgment was a backward step because
the Court recognized a new catalogue of exceptions to the principle of free
movement, additional to those expressly listed in article 36 of the Treaty. The
exact relationship between the article 36 exceptions and the mandatory requirements recognized in Cassis de Dijon and in subsequent judgments has been the

7. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fOr Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R.
649, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8543 (1979).
8. A better expression in English would have been "imperative requirements."
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subject of considerable debate-more debate perhaps than the issue is worth.
Three points should be noted:
First, the mandatory requirements recognized in Cassis de Dijon can only save
measures that apply without distinction to domestic and imported goods,
whereas article 36 may save measures that do not satisfy that test, provided that
9
they do not constitute arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade.
Secondly, the Court has consistently held that, since article 36 derogates from
a fundamental principle of the Treaty, it must be construed narrowly. Thus the
grounds listed in article 36 justifying restrictions on free movement are exhaustive. 0 On the other hand, the list of mandatory requirements recognized in
Cassis de Dijon is not a closed category, as is proved by the fact that the Court
has occasionally added to it.
Thirdly, whatever ground is invoked as justification for a measure restricting
free movement, whether it be an interest mentioned in article 36 or a mandatory
requirement under Cassis de Dijon, the measure in question will be tested against
the principle of proportionality. The measure will only be upheld if (a) it is an
appropriate means of attaining the objective in question (for example, the protection of public health or fair trading) and (b) the objective could not be attained
by other means less restrictive of trade between Member States.
Since 1979 the Court has delivered many judgments confirming the principle
that goods manufactured and marketed in a Member State in accordance with the
local legislation may be imported into any other Member State unless some
mandatory requirement justifies their exclusion. The Court has for instance condemned a Belgian law requiring margarine to be sold only in cube-shaped packets, a German law prohibiting the use of additives in beer,' 2 and an Italian law
permitting only durum wheat to be used for the manufacture of pasta. ' 3 On the
other hand, the court has upheld a Danish law prohibiting the use of nonreturnable bottles, thus recognizing the protection of the environment as an additional
mandatory requirement. 14
It is sometimes suggested that goods originating in nonmember countries
cannot benefit from the Cassis de Dijon principle. 15 That view does not accord

9. See Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-179/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior v. Departamento
de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de laGeneralitat de Catalufila, para. 13 (Judgment of July 25, 1991)
(not yet published).
10. See, e.g., Case 95/81, Commission v. Italy, 1982 E.C.R. 2187, [1981-1983 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8846 (1982).
11. Case 261/81, Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt, 1982 E.C.R. 3961, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8979 (1982).
12. Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227.
13. Case 407/85, 3 Glocken GmbH v. USL Centro-Sud, 1988 E.C.R. 4233.
14. Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
15. Eric L. White, In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, 20 COMM. MKT. L.
REV. 235, 259-80 (1989). Contra Laurence W. Gormley, 'Actually or Potentially, Directly or
Indirectly"? Obstacles to the Free Movement of Goods, 9 Y.B. EUR. L. 197, 204 (1989).
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with the wording of article 9(2) of the Treaty or with the case law of the Court
of Justice, which holds that, once such goods have been duly imported into a
Member State and any customs duties payable have been accounted for, they
must be treated in the same way as goods originating in the Community. 16 If the
goods comply with one Member State's legislation and have been placed on the
market there bonafide, their admission to other Member States may be restricted
only on the grounds mentioned in article 36 or in order to satisfy some other
mandatory requirement.
III. Legislation Governing the Circumstances
in Which Goods May Be Marketed
A.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

All the cases referred to in the previous section had one thing in common: the
Member State concerned prohibited the sale of goods not manufactured in accordance with certain rules governing the physical characteristics of goods. The
obstacles to trade resulting from such legislation are manifest. Laws regulating
the composition and presentation of goods, or prescribing technical standards for
goods, have an obvious capacity to impede trade between Member States if
applied to imported goods. They would rapidly lead to what is sometimes called
the "balkanization" of the economy.
In recent years the Court has been faced with a number of cases in which
article 30 and the Cassis de Dijon principle have been invoked, not in relation to
legislation governing the physical characteristics of goods, but in relation to
legislation governing the circumstances in which goods may be marketed-rules
as to where, when, by whom, how, or at what price goods may be sold, or rules
on the advertising of goods.
Such legislation may impede trade between Member States, but the obstacles
are much less obvious than in the case of legislation of the type in issue in Cassis
de Dijon. For example, a law restricting the sale of alcohol to certain types of
establishments impedes trade less than a law prohibiting the sale of alcohol
altogether. As a result the Court has had great difficulty when confronted with
rules governing marketing circumstances, and it has not always been consistent
in its approach to the concept of measures having equivalent effect. Two conflicting strains are evident in the case law: the Oebel strain and the Oosthoek
strain.
In cases belonging to the Oebel strain the Court adopts a narrow construction
of the concept of measures having equivalent effect and excludes a particular
measure from the scope of article 30, even though the measure has an undeniable
16. Case 41/76, Donckerwolke v. Procureur de la Rrpublique, 1976 E.C.R. 1921, 20 C.M.L.R.
535 (1976) (paras 17-18); Case 125/88, Nijman, 1989 E.C.R. 3533, 60 C.M.L.R. 92 (1988)
(para. 11).
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capacity to affect trade between Member States. In cases belonging to the Oosthoek strain the Court adopts a broad construction of the concept of measures
having equivalent effect, assumes that a particular measure may in principle be
caught by article 30, and then proceeds to examine whether it is justified. In the
course of that examination the Court sometimes gives the impression that it is
laboring to avoid undue interference in areas for which the Member States are
primarily competent.
B.

THE OEBEL STRAIN

In Oebelt 7 the Court ruled that German legislation prohibiting the transport
and delivery of bakers' wares to consumers and retailers between 10:00 P.M. and
5:45 A.M., the object of which was to ensure compliance with a prohibition on
night work in bakeries, could not have the effect of restricting imports or exports
between Member States. That statement cannot be taken at face value. Since
transport and delivery to wholesalers was excluded from the prohibition, the
effect on intra-Community trade was admittedly slight. But some effect must
have existed, especially in frontier zones. The Oebel ruling must be read in light
of the facts of the case. Mr. Oebel, the manager of a bakery in Wiesbaden,
Germany, was prosecuted for allowing his staff to work at night. Such a prosecution was unlikely to affect imports from other Member States. It would have
been a different matter if a baker from Strasbourg had been apprehended at 5:00
A.M. while on his way to deliver bread to shops in Karlsruhe.
In Blesgen v. Belgium 18 a Belgian restaurant owner was prosecuted for stocking and selling spirits of an alcoholic strength exceeding twenty-two degrees. In
Belgium, although such goods could be sold in shops, their sale for consumption
on the premises in bars and restaurants was prohibited at that time by a law
designed to combat alcoholism. 19 Mr. Blesgen argued that the law was contrary
to article 30 of the Treaty inasmuch as it affected the importation and sale of
spirits imported from other Member States. The Belgian Court of Cassation
asked the Court of Justice whether such legislation amounted to a measure
having equivalent effect under article 30 and, if so, whether it was justified on
grounds of the protection of health under article 36.
In a much-criticized 20 judgment the Court held that legislation of the type
described was not caught by article 30. The Court observed, somewhat implausibly, that the legislation "has no connection with the importation of products
17.

Case 155/80, Oebel, 1981 E.C.R. 1993, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.

(CCH) 8767 (1981).
18. Case 75/81, Blesgen v. Belgium, 1982 E.C.R. 1211, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8823 (1982).
19. The law in question has since been repealed.
20. See, e.g., Anthony M. Amull, Cassis de Dijon: Growth Stunted?, 7 EUR. L. REV. 393
(1982); D. Waelbroeck, 1983 CAreERS DE DROIT EUROP8EN [CAHIERS DR. EURO.] 241; N. Annecchino, 1983 IL FORO ITALIANO [FORO IT.] IV col. 348.
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and for that reason is not of such a nature as to impede trade between Member
States. ' 21 That statement was highly tendentious because Belgium, although the
home of a substantial brewing industry, is not a noted producer of strong liquor;
obviously the spirits that people would have drunk in Belgian bars and restaurants, if the law had allowed them to, would to a large extent have been imported
from other Member States. Moreover, many customers of bars and restaurants in
Belgium who were denied the chance to drink Scotch whisky or French cognac
doubtless ended up consuming Belgian beer. Hence, whatever the object of the
law might be, it was discriminatory and protectionist in effect.
It is of course arguable that, if the Belgian law had been found to be contrary
to article 30, it would have been saved by article 36 as being justified on grounds
of the protection of health. A curious feature of some of the Court's case law on
the free movement of goods is that, though most of the judgments are defensible
as to the result, the reasoning by which the result is reached is sometimes
defective. The measure at issue in Oebel might have been defended on the
ground that it was an appropriate means of protecting the health of workers in the
baking industry.
For some years Oebel and Blesgen were regarded as something of an anomaly.
It was thought that they were isolated examples of a narrow interpretation of
article 30. Oebel and Blesgen have recently made something of a comeback in a
series of judgments concerned with a British Act of Parliament restricting the
operation of sex shops. Under the British Act such establishments may in certain
circumstances be subjected to a licensing requirement. Quietlynn v. Southend
Borough Council22 concerned a prosecution for operating an unlicensed sex
shop. The defendants argued that the licensing requirement, which resulted in
their being excluded from the main shopping areas, was contrary to article 30
since much of their merchandise was imported from other Member States and the
effect of the Act was to reduce their sales of such goods. The English court found
that the legislation indirectly reduced in absolute terms the volume of imports
from other Member States. The Court of Justice nonetheless refused to entertain
the suggestion that such legislation might be a measure having equivalent effect
within the meaning of article 30. The Court observed that the Act applied
without distinction to domestic and imported products. It cited Oebel and Blesgen, stated that such legislation had no connection with intra-Community trade,
since the products in question could be marketed through licensed sex shops and
other channels, and concluded that the Act was not intended to regulate trade in
goods within the Community and was not therefore of such a nature as to impede
trade between Member States.
Once again the Court's judgment is defensible in the result since the public
morality exception in article 36 would almost certainly have saved the British
21. Blesgen, Common Mkt. Rep. 8823 at 7745.
22. Case C-23/89, Quietlynn v. Southend Borough Council, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3059.
SUMMER 1992
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legislation, but the reasoning is questionable. The fact that national legislation is
not intended to regulate trade in goods within the Community does not necessarily mean that it cannot impede trade between Member States. Exactly the
same could have been said of the German law prohibiting the sale of Cassis de
Dijon with less than 25 percent alcohol. Nor should the nondiscriminatory nature
of the legislation necessarily remove it from the scope of article 30. It has been
axiomatic since the Cassis de Dijon judgment that nondiscriminatory measures
do not automatically escape the prohibition laid down by article 30.
C.

THE OOSTHOEK STRAIN

Oebel, Blesgen, and Quietlynn are all the more surprising if compared with
the judgments representing the Oosthoek strain. The first example of that strain
is Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij.23 A Dutch law prohibited the practice of
promoting sales by means of offering gifts. Oosthoek marketed in the Netherlands, Belgium, and part of France Dutch-language encyclopedias printed
partly in the Netherlands and partly in Belgium. The company was prosecuted
by the Dutch authorities for offering gifts such as an atlas or a dictionary to
promote sales of its encyclopedias. Oosthoek raised a defence based on article
30 and the matter was referred to the Court of Justice. On the face of it, the
interference with interstate trade was minimal, but the Court nevertheless held,
perhaps a little surprisingly in view of what it had said in Blesgen a few months
earlier, that legislation that forced a trader to abandon a particular marketing
method might be contrary to article 30. The Court then proceeded to enquire
whether the Dutch legislation was justified on grounds of consumer protection
and held that it was.
In a sense of course, the result was the same as in Oebel, Blesgen, and
Quietlynn, because the restrictive measure adopted by a Member State was found
to be compatible with Community law, but the means by which that result was
reached were very different. In Oebel, Blesgen, and Quietlynn the Court maintained, rather unconvincingly, that trade between Member States could not be
affected by the national measure and therefore excluded all possibility of a
breach of article 30. In Oosthoek the Court recognized that the national measure
might infringe article 30, even though arguably the effect on trade between
Member States was less significant than in the other cases, and then found that
the measure was justified.
In Buet 24 the Court had to consider a French law that prohibited the door-todoor selling of educational material. Mr. Buet managed a company that used
such methods to sell English-language teaching material manufactured in Belgium. He was prosecuted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In his appeal
23. Case 286/81, Oesthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1982 E.C.R. 4575, [1981-1983 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8895 (1982).
24. Case 382/87, Buet v. Minist~re Public, 1989 E.C.R. 1235.
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he argued that the French law was contrary to article 30, and the case was
referred to the Court of Justice.
Citing Oosthoek, the Court ruled that to deprive a trader of a method of
marketing whereby he realized almost all his sales might constitute an obstacle
to imports even though the legislation in question applied to domestic and imported products without distinction. Adopting a classical Cassis de Dijon approach, the Court then enquired whether that obstacle to free movement was
necessary to satisfy mandatory requirements such as consumer protection or fair
trading. The Court observed that measures restricting free movement must be
proportionate to the aim pursued, and that if a Member State had at its disposal
less restrictive means of attaining the same aims it must use them. Observing that
the consumer could normally be adequately protected by means of a statutory
right to cancel a contract concluded at home, the Court went on to state that the
risk of an ill-considered purchase increased when the product in question was
educational material since the potential customers, who were often behind with
their education and anxious to catch up, were particularly vulnerable. On that
basis the Court held that it was permissible for a national legislature to prohibit
canvassing at private residences.
Two recent judgments appear to confirm that the Oosthoek strain is dominant
and that the Oebel strain is on the wane, notwithstanding Quietlynn. In GBINNO-BM v. Confederationdu Commerce Luxembourgeois25 the Court was asked
to give a preliminary ruling in proceedings that arose out of an attempt by an
organization representing Luxembourg shopkeepers to prevent the owners of a
supermarket situated in Arlon, just across the Belgian border, from distributing
advertising matter to households in Luxembourg. The advertising did not comply
with the Luxembourg law on unfair competition, according to which sales offers
involving a temporary price reduction may not state the duration of the offer or
refer to previous prices. The advertising did, however, comply with Belgian law.
The Court found that the application of the Luxembourg legislation to the
Belgian supermarket's advertising was capable of breaching article 30. Observing that the obstacle to trade was due to disparities between national laws, the
Court proceeded to examine-under the Cassis de Dijon approach-whether the
restriction on trade was justified as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory
requirements relating to consumer protection. The Court held that there was no
such justification, essentially on the ground that Community policy, as laid down
in a program adopted by the Council of Ministers, requires that consumers
should have access to information so that they can make their purchasing decisions in full knowledge of the facts; a regulation that denies consumers access to
a particular type of information, even though the information is perfectly accurate, cannot be justified in the name of consumer protection.
25. Case C-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Conffdfration du Commerce Luxembourgeois, 1990
E.C.R. 1-667.
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The recent judgment in Aragonesa de PublicidadExterior v. Departamentode
Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generalitatde Catalufia26 also dealt with a
restriction on certain forms of advertising. The parliament of Catalonia, one of
the autonomous regions of Spain, passed a law prohibiting the advertising of
beverages containing more than twenty-three degrees of alcohol in cinemas, on
public transport, and along streets and roads. Two advertising agencies were
charged with infringing that law. They contended that the law was contrary to
article 30, since it restricted the advertising of products originating in other
Member States. The Court of Justice was asked to give a preliminary ruling.
The Court stated unequivocally that such legislation must in principle be
regarded as a measure having equivalent effect under article 30. However, it
went on to hold that the restriction on trade was justified, under article 36, on
grounds of the protection of public health. The case provides a good illustration
of how an article 36 analysis works in practice. In order for the Catalan legislation to enjoy the benefit of article 36 it was necessary to establish: (a) that the
legislation contributed to its stated goal of protecting public health; (b) that the
restriction on trade caused by the legislation was not disproportionate in relation
to that goal; and (c) that the legislation did not constitute arbitrary discrimination
or a disguised restriction on trade, within the meaning of the second sentence of
article 36. As regards the first two points, the acceptability of the legislation was
never in much doubt. On the third point it was argued that the legislation was
discriminatory because it permitted the advertising of the typical products of
Catalonia (still and sparkling wine) and prohibited the advertising of typical
imported products (whiskey and cognac). The Court rejected that argument,
observing that Catalonia is in fact a substantial producer of alcoholic drinks that
exceed the threshold of twenty-three degrees. The Court might also have noted
that the threshold is based on an objective criterion, since strong liquor is in
principle more harmful to health than less alcoholic beverages. On that basis the
case could have been distinguished from an earlier case, Commission v.
France,2 7 in which the Court condemned a French provision that banned the
advertising of spirits made from grain but permitted the advertising of spirits
made from wine. The legislation at issue in Blesgen could have been upheld on
the same basis if the Court had found it contrary to article 30 and proceeded to
enquire whether it could be saved by article 36.
D.

THE SUNDAY TRADING CASES

Against this background of conflict between cases belonging to the Oebel
strain and cases belonging to the Oosthoek strain we must examine the Court's
case law on Sunday trading.
26. See source cited supra note 9.
27. Case 152/78, Commission v. France, 1980 E.C.R. 2299, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8691 (1980).
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In many European countries the law restricts or prohibits the opening of shops
on Sundays. On the face of it, nothing in the EEC Treaty suggests that the
regulation of shop opening hours is anything other than a matter for the national
legislatures. Nor is it immediately obvious that laws requiring shops to close on
Sundays are an obstacle to trade between Member States. However, some years
ago a chain of do-it-yourself stores called "B & Q" started opening on Sundays
in England in defiance of the British Shops Act 1950. When prosecuted, it
contended that the British statute was contrary to article 30, arguing that its total
sales would decline if it were forced to close on Sundays and that, since some of
the goods it sold were manufactured in other Member States, the effect was to
reduce the volume of imports. Cwmbran Magistrates' Court sought a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice.
28
It is evident from reading the judgment in Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q
that the Sixth Chamber of the Court had some difficulty in dealing with what
must have struck most observers as a particularly fanciful attempt to mount a
challenge on a national statute by means of Community law. The Court appears
to have been mesmerized by a finding of fact by the national court to the effect
that the volume of imports was reduced by the ban on Sunday trading (though a
similar finding of fact by the national court in Quietlynn does not seem to have
troubled the Court in the same degree).
But the Court seems to have been reluctant to state openly that a ban on Sunday
trading might be a measure having equivalent effect within the meaning of article
30. Instead it began by citing the Cingthequejudgment, 29 in which the Court had
held that a French ban on the sale or hire of videocassettes during the first twelve
months after a motion picture's release was not compatible with the principle of
free movement unless any obstacle to Community trade thereby created did not
exceed what was necessary to ensure the attainment of the objective in view and
unless that objective was justified with regard to Community law.
The Court had no difficulty in holding that the second criterion was satisfied
in the case of legislation restricting Sunday trading: Rules regarding the opening
hours of retail premises "reflect certain political and economic choices in so far
as their purpose is to ensure that working and non-working hours are so arranged
as to accord with national or regional sociocultural characteristics, and that, in
30
the present state of Community law, is a matter for the Member States."
So far the Court's judgment is unobjectionable. In relation to the other
criterion-namely, whether the obstacle to trade exceeded what was necessary to
attain the aim in question-the Court's performance is less satisfactory. For some
28. Case 145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q, 1989 E.C.R. 3851, 59 C.M.L.R. 455
(1989).
29. Joined Cases 60/84 and 61/84, Cinrth~que S.A. v. Federation Nationale des Cindmas
Francais, 1985 E.C.R. 2605, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,220
(1985).
30. B & Q, 1989 E.C.R. at 3889.
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reason it resurrected a rather obscure legislative provision adopted in 1969,
namely article 3 of Commission Directive 70/50.3 1
That directive was based on article 33(7) of the Treaty, which empowered the
Commission to issue directives establishing the procedure and timetable for
abolishing measures having equivalent effect. In 1969 the Commission took the
view that nondiscriminatory measures relating to the marketing of goods did not
normally constitute measures having equivalent effect. 32 The directive therefore
required, by article 2, the abolition of all discriminatory measures that hinder
imports and, by article 3, the abolition of:
[M]easures governing the marketing of products which deal, in particular, with shape,
size, weight, composition, presentation, identification or putting up and which are
equally applicable to domestic and imported products, where the restrictive effect of
such measures on the free movement of goods exceeds the effects intrinsic to trade
rules.
Since that approach had long since been rejected by the Court in Cassis de Dijon,
it is a little surprising that the Court should have placed such reliance on it in the
B & Q case and held that the test for assessing the compatibility with the Treaty
of the Sunday trading law was whether "the restrictive effect of such measures
33
on the free movement of goods exceeds the effects intrinsic to trade rules."
What is even more surprising is that the Court then held that the question whether
specific national rules in fact remain within that limit was a question of fact to be
determined by the national court. The result was a preliminary ruling of almost
Delphic obscurity that gave the national court little guidance as to the compatibility of the national legislation with the Treaty. The matter has inevitably been
the subject of much further litigation in the English courts, culminating in
another reference to the Court of Justice.
In the meantime the Court has given a second judgment on the issue of Sunday
trading, pursuant to references for a preliminary ruling from French and Belgian
courts. 34 In France and Belgium the employment of workers on Sundays is
prohibited, subject to certain exceptions. A number of large stores decided to
open on Sundays and employed staff for that purpose in defiance of the national
laws. When proceedings were taken against them, the cases were referred to the
Court of Justice.
The resulting judgments are interesting to compare and contrast with the B & Q
judgment delivered only fifteen months earlier. In Conforama and Marchandise
the Court expressly recognized that the legislation in question might have a
negative effect on imports and recalled that in B & Q it had held that a ban on
Sunday trading was not compatible with the principle of the free movement of
31. 1970 O.J. SPEC. ED. 1 17.
32. See id. eighth recital in preamble.
33. B & Q, 1989 E.C.R. at 3889.
34. See Case C-312/89, Conforama (Judgment of Feb. 28, 1991) (not yet reported); Case
C-332/89, Minist re Public v. Marchandise (Judgment of Feb. 28, 1991) (not yet reported).
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goods unless the resulting obstacle to Community trade did not exceed what was
necessary to attain the objective in question and unless that objective was justified with regard to Community law. As in B & Q, the Court held that the
objective pursued by the legislation was justified. But the Conforamaand Marchandise judgments differed from B & Q when it came to assessing whether the
obstacles to Community trade exceeded what was necessary to attain the objective in question. No reference was made to Directive 70/50, and the judgments
gave no suggestion that the matter was a question of fact to be determined by the
national court. Instead the Court simply observed that the restrictive effects on
trade resulting from the legislation in question did not appear excessive with
regard to the objective pursued. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the prohibition
laid down in article 30 did not apply to national legislation prohibiting the
employment of workers on Sundays.
The apparent conflict between B & Q and the later rulings has not escaped the
attention of the English courts. The House of Lords has recently referred questions to the Court of Justice, asking in substance whether the clear determination
of compatibility with article 30 made in Conforama and Marchandise also ap35
plies to the English provisions on Sunday trading.
E.

CONCLUSIONS

If the object of this article were to defend the Court of Justice against a charge
of inconsistency, it would be easy to point out that the measures at issue in
Oosthoek, Buet, GB-INNO-BM and Aragonesa de PublicidadExterior were all
caught by the principle-first formulated in paragraph 15 of the Oosthoek
judgment-that "Legislation which restricts or prohibits certain forms of advertising and certain means of sales promotion may, although it does not directly
affect imports, be such as to restrict their volume because it affects marketing
opportunities for the imported products." 36 A similar statement occurs in the
other three judgments belonging to the Oosthoek strain. The measures at issue in
Oebel, Blesgen, Quietlynn, and the Sunday trading cases, on the other hand, do
not fall so squarely within that formula.
It is submitted, however, that an attempt to distinguish the two groups of cases
on that basis would be futile. In the first place, the measures at issue in Blesgen
and Quietlynn did in fact restrict "certain means of sales promotion" inasmuch
as they prevented goods from being marketed through certain channels. But the
overwhelming objection to such a distinction is that it would be entirely devoid
of logic. To pretend that a law prohibiting the advertising of strong alcoholic
drinks in certain places may affect intra-Community trade, whereas a law pro35. See Case C-169/91, Stoke-on-Trent Council v. B & Q (referred to the Court of Justice by
order of 19 June 1991).
36. Case 286/81, Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1982 E.C.R. 4575, [1981-1983 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8895, at 8546 (1982).
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hibiting the sale of strong alcoholic drinks in certain establishments can have no
such effect, is simply ludicrous. If any distinction at all is to be made between
the two types of measure, it is the prohibition on sale-rather than the prohibition on advertising-that should be treated more sternly by the Court, since it
inevitably affects trade to a greater degree. Similarly, it would make no sense to
argue that a law prohibiting the door-to-door selling of certain products is in
principle caught by article 30 but that a law prohibiting the sale of certain
products in bars and restaurants lies entirely outside the scope of article 30.
It is submitted therefore that the Court should in future attempt to be more
consistent in its approach to measures governing the circumstances in which
goods may be marketed. Two avenues are open to it: Either it may in all cases
adopt the broad approach of Oosthoek and apply the Dassonville formula more
or less literally; or it may look for a modified version of that formula that would
catch all measures that genuinely interfere with trade between Member States, to
the exclusion of measures whose effect on such trade is remote and contingent.
But the search for such a formula is perilously difficult and for that reason it may
be preferable for the Court to construe the concept of measures having equivalent
effect broadly, as in the Oosthoek strain of case law, and to be correspondingly
generous in examining whether a particular measure is justified either under
article 36 or by reference to "mandatory requirements."
On the question of justification, a striking feature of the Sunday trading judgments and of the earlier Cingthdque judgment is that they do not use the expression "mandatory requirements." Instead they simply require that the measure
restricting trade should be "justified with regard to Community law." That seems
to imply a lower standard of justification. The objectives pursued by the measures in question do not have to be mandatory (that is, imperative or overriding);
they merely have to be consistent with Community policy or at least not repugnant to it. The application of a lower standard of justification in such cases is not
without logic, since the measures in question are less restrictive of intraCommunity trade than the type of measure at issue in Cassis de Dijon and similar
cases. However, if the Court is applying a lower standard of justification it
should say so openly and explain why. It should also apply the same standard in
all cases relating to measures that regulate the circumstances in which goods may
be marketed, as opposed to measures governing the physical characteristics of
goods, for which the criteria laid down in Cassis de Dijon remain valid.
IV. The Judgment in HAG II
No survey of recent case law on the free movement of goods would be
complete without mentioning the judgment in CNL Sucal v. HAG AG (known as
HAG II).37 The case was concerned with one of the grounds expressly mentioned
37. Case C-10/89, SA CNL Sucal NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3711, 59 C.M.L.R. 571
(1990) [hereinafter HAG I1].
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in article 36 as justifying exceptions to the principle of free movement, namely
the protection of industrial and commercial property. The judgment is important
for two reasons: first, because the Court reappraised the misguided negative
attitude towards trademarks displayed in some of its earlier judgments, and
38
secondly, because the Court expressly overruled, for the first time in its history,
one of its previous judgments.
At the beginning of the century a German company (HAG Bremen) began
producing decaffeinated coffee under the trademark "HAG," which it registered
in Germany. Later it also registered the mark in Belgium and Luxembourg and
transferred those registrations to a Belgian subsidiary that it had established.
After the Second World War the assets of the Belgian subsidiary, including the
trademark "HAG," were confiscated as enemy property. In 1947 they were sold
to the Van Oevelen family, which subsequently assigned the mark to a firm called
Van Zuylen. The result was that in Belgium and Luxembourg the mark was
owned by Van Zuylen, whereas in Germany and other countries the mark was
still owned by HAG Bremen. In 1971 HAG Bremen started to sell coffee in
Luxembourg under the HAG mark. Van Zuylen's attempt to obtain an injunction
restraining HAG Bremen's infringement of its trademark failed after the Court of
Justice had stated in a preliminary ruling that:
To prohibit the marketing in one Member State of a product legally bearing a trademark
in another Member State for the sole reason that an identical trademark, having the
same origin, exists in the first State, is incompatible with the provisions for the free
movement of goods within the Common Market. 39
The principle thus enunciated became known as the doctrine of common
origin. From the outset it was ferociously attacked by a host of critics and had
few defenders. Its implications were disturbing. The doctrine appeared to mean,
for example, that, where an undertaking had disposed of a trademark by assignment in one country-even years before the EEC was created-but retained an
identical mark in another country, the assignor and assignee could each use the
mark in the other's territory, notwithstanding the confusion thus engendered for
the consumer. The doctrine of common origin would also mean, if the 1974
ruling were construed literally, that the owner of the mark in Belgium and
Luxembourg could use it in Germany, where the registration still belonged to the
original owner, HAG Bremen. That is exactly what came to pass.
In 1979 the firm Van Zuylen fell into the hands of the Swiss company Jacobs
Suchard AG (of which CNL Sucal was a wholly owned subsidiary). Jacobs
Suchard AG was the market leader for coffee products in Germany, except for
38. It is true that in Case C-70/88, European Parliament v. Council, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2041, the
Court effectively overruled its earlier decision in Case 302/87, European Parliament v. Council, 1988
E.C.R. 5615. However, the Court did not on that occasion expressly recognize that it was overruling
one of its previous decisions.
39. Case 192/73, Van Zuylen v. HAG, 1974 E.C.R. 731, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) V 8230 (1974) [hereinafter HAG 1].
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decaffeinated coffee; that sector was dominated by HAG Bremen. The mark
"HAG" is in fact almost a synonym for decaffeinated coffee in Germany. Jacobs
Suchard AG thus had an obvious interest in acquiring the Belgian and Luxembourg registrations of the HAG trademark and supplying decaffeinated coffee
under that mark to the German market. That is precisely what it began doing in
1985. When HAG Bremen applied to the German courts for an injunction to
restrain the infringement of its trademark, the matter was eventually referred to
the Court of Justice.
The Court was faced with three choices. It could: (1) extend the scope of the
doctrine of common origin and allow the acquirer of the expropriated mark to use
it in the territory of the original owner; (2) distinguish the two cases on the
ground that the acquirer of the expropriated mark, like a party to an assignment,
voluntarily participates in the fragmentation of the mark or at least knows that he
is acquiring a fragmented mark, whereas the victim of the expropriation does not
consent to the fragmentation of the mark; or (3) abandon the doctrine of common
origin completely and recognize that following the subdivision of a trademark, at
least a subdivision that took place before the EEC had even been conceived of,
each proprietor is entitled to the exclusive use of the mark in its own territory.
The first option, which was of course the one favored by CNL Sucal, was most
unlikely to be accepted because it would have given extraterritorial effect to the
expropriation that took place in Belgium and would have deprived HAG Bremen
of the exclusive use of the mark in Germany even though it had never consented
to the fragmentation. That would hardly have been consistent with the Court's
case law as it had developed subsequent to HAG J.40
The second option was based on the assumption that, where a trademark
comes into divided ownership as a result of an assignment, the assignor who
retains the mark in one Member State and the assignee who acquires it in another
Member State may use the mark in each other's territory. The Court's judgment
in Sirena v. Eda4 1 supports that assumption. If the assumption were correct, it
would be logical to treat the purchaser of the expropriated mark in the same way
as an assignee, but it would not be logical to treat the victim of the expropriation
in the same way as the assignor, since it did not consent to the operation.
The Court chose the third option-rightly, it is submitted-and expressly
overruled HAG I. It did so after a radical reappraisal of the importance of
trademarks, which in some earlier judgments had been treated rather contemp-

40. See Case 19/84, Pharmon v. Hoechst, 1985 E.C.R. 2281, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,206 (1985) in which the Court held that the proprietor of a patent
may oppose imports of products manufactured with the patented process in another Member State by
a person who has obtained a compulsory license under a parallel patent held by the same proprietor.
It would not be logical to treat a person whose trademark was expropriated without compensation less
favorably than a patent-holder against whom a compulsory license was issued.
41. Case 40/70, Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. 69, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8101 (1971).
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tuously by the Court. The negative attitude had been initiated by Advocate
General Dutheillet de Lamothe who, in his Opinion in Sirena v. Eda, made a
far-fetched comparison between a brand of shaving cream and penicillin in an
attempt to prove that patents are more worthy of protection than trademarks.
In HAG H, by way of contrast, the Court recognized that trademarks constitute
"an essential element of the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty
seeks to establish and maintain." A trademark could only perform its essential
function of guaranteeing to the consumer that all goods on which it is placed have
the same commercial origin if the proprietor retained the exclusive right to use
it. That conclusion was not affected by the fact that the mark in question having
originally belonged to a single person in two Member States and that person
having been deprived of it in one of those States as a result of an expropriation
before the creation of the EEC. After the expropriation the mark continued to
fulfil its function, independently in each of the territories concerned, of guaranteeing that all goods bearing the mark came from the same source.
Although it was not strictly necessary for the Court to overrule HAG I, it is
submitted that it was right to do so because of the unacceptable confusion that
would ensue for consumers if entirely separate persons, between whom there is
no legal or economic link, were allowed to use the same trademark in the same
territory. A degree of confusion is of course inevitable when a trademark belongs
to different persons in different countries, especially in an age of international
travel. Such confusion is regrettable-the more so in a common market-but it
cannot be eliminated by allowing each proprietor of the mark to use it in the
territory of the other. It must also be remembered that the Van Oevelen family
gave valuable consideration for the purchase of the Belgian and Luxembourg
marks in 1947 and were entitled to assume that, as the law stood then, the
transaction was valid and they were obtaining an exclusive right. They could not
have known that the EEC Treaty would come into existence twelve years later.
The judgment in HAG I thus corrected an injustice perpetrated by the Court in
HAG I.
HAG II is also important, in a more general sense, because it demonstrates an
enlightened attitude towards the relative value of precedent. The Court of Justice, following the tradition of civil law countries, had never before expressly
overruled one of its previous decisions. It had occasionally ignored a precedent
that it apparently wished to depart from, but it had never expressly indicated that
it considered a previous decision wrong. From that point of view also, HAG H
is a welcome development.
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